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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel cost-reflective and com-
putationally efficient method for allocating distribution network
costs to residential customers. First, the method estimates the
growth in peak demand with a 50% probability of exceedance
(50POE) and the associated network augmentation costs using a
probabilistic long-run marginal cost computation based on the
Turvey perturbation method. Second, it allocates these costs to
customers on a cost-causal basis using the Shapley value solution
concept. To overcome the intractability of the exact Shapley
value computation for real-world applications, we implement
a fast, scalable and efficient clustering technique based on
customers’ peak demand contribution, which drastically reduces
the Shapley value computation time. Using customer load traces
from an Australian smart grid trial (Solar Home Electricity Data),
we demonstrate the efficacy of our method by comparing it
with established energy- and peak demand-based cost allocation
approaches.
Index Terms—Turvey perturbation method, long-run marginal
cost, Shapley value, k-means clustering, cost-causality, demand-
based tariffs, cost-reflective network pricing
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid rise in the penetration levels of distributed energy
resources in low-voltage distribution networks necessitates the
design of network tariffs that allocate associated network costs
in an efficient, fair and equitable manner to network users.
Hence, distribution network service providers (DNSPs) and
regulators in most jurisdictions are challenged with the tasks
of designing efficient tariffs that are reflective of network
cost drivers [1]. Recent studies in this area have explored
different methods for distribution network pricing, including
transmission network pricing methodologies, such as Loca-
tional Marginal Pricing (LMP), Postage Stamp (PS), MW-
Mile, MVA-Mile, Average Participation (AP), and Marginal
Participation (MP) [2–6], Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, cooper-
ative game theory or other extemporaneous cost allocation
methodologies. However, in order to establish the performance
of these methods with respect to established tariff design
principles [7], which includes cost reflectiveness, efficiency,
stability and fairness, we need to define a measure (bench-
mark) of overall performance, with which to compare existing
methods. To this end, the purpose of our study is to use a
principled cost allocation method as a performance benchmark
for other allocation methodologies.
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Distribution network costs typically comprises three ma-
jor cost components–energy costs, long-run marginal cost
(LRMC), and residual (such as retail charges) costs. In order
to adequately recover these cost components, network tariffs
should be structured such that the fixed, energy and/or demand
charges efficiently send the right price signals to customers to
respond appropriately. For example, [8] used a three-part tariff
for distribution network cost allocation. Here, the residual
costs ($/day) were recovered through Ramsey pricing, while
the LRMC ($/kW) and energy costs ($/kWh) were recovered
through coincident peak pricing and distribution locational
marginal pricing (DLMP) respectively.
Nevertheless, network tariffs historically only consisted of
energy-based (volumetric) and residual charges due to two
reasons: (i) there was little need to signal the LRMCs be-
cause loads per feeder were relatively flat and (ii) pricing
mechanisms available to utilities were severely constrained
by metering technology. However, with the introduction of
smart meters, it is possible to implement tariffs which reflect
congestion costs that drives network investments. As such,
network tariffs should be based on customers demand at
network peak [8–13]. It should be time- and location-specific
and should account for network losses and actual customer
energy use. Additionally, a fair and equitable tariff should also
eliminate or reduce inter-customer subsidies created due to PV
owners, while safeguarding vulnerable customers [14, 15].
Unlike volumetric tariffs, peak demand-based tariffs are
robust to technological changes (such as solar PV, EV or
battery storage) which reshapes customers’ demand profiles
while effectively signalling peak demand costs to customers
[15, 16]. Thus, residual and/or LRMC costs can be recovered
partly through demand-charges instead of constantly increas-
ing fixed or energy charges for all customers [6, 17]. So far,
coincident peak pricing (CPP) and critical peak pricing have
been proposed to mitigate the impacts of DER on the equity of
network cost allocations. Although peak demand-based tariffs
are more complex than energy-based tariffs, they can better
allocate network costs on a cost-causal basis and ensure a
stable revenue for network companies [15, 17]. Furthermore,
[18] showed that customer bill volatility reduces with demand-
based tariffs compared to real time pricing and time-of-use
tariffs. Contrarily, [12] tested demand-based tariffs proposed
by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) on households
in Sydney. It was concluded that without due adjustments
made, these tariffs are low in cost-reflectivity. Generally, the
suitability of network tariffs in terms of fairness and cost-
reflectivity depends on the assumptions made in the tariff
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2design and on customers’ price response [19]. This further
highlights the need for a principled cost allocation benchmark.
Further still, the distribution network tariff design problem
encompasses more than the aforementioned requirements. Be-
yond these, there are other three salient tariff design questions
that need to be answered in order to achieve a cost-reflective
pricing and appropriate customer response: (i) What LRMC
calculation method should be used – the Turvey perturbation
method or the Average Incremental Cost method? (ii) What
peak demand should be the basis for charging customers
– individual customer peak, distribution network coincident
peak or zone-substation peak? and, (iii) What is the optimal
frequency of peak demand measurement – monthly or yearly
basis? [17]. The answers to these questions form the basis for
practically implementing tariffs that better recuperate forward-
looking network costs. However, there are no clear-cut answers
to these questions, because choices for network companies
depend on other factors, such as customer socio-demographics,
customer class, and the availability of smart meters and energy
management systems. Nonetheless, recent research in the area
argues that demand-based tariffs should be based on network
coincident peak since it better signals LRMC. However, in
practice, customers’ coincident peak demand is hard to mea-
sure and thus CPP is difficult to implement. Thus, demand
charges are a step-forward to attaining optimal network tariffs.
In this paper, we seek, based on established economic prin-
ciples, to make a further step towards the design of equitable
network pricing. Our focus is to provide a measure for the
fair and efficient allocation of costs that signal the drivers
of future network investment. To achieve this, we develop a
novel method to apportion the LRMC, using a probabilistic
approach to the Turvey perturbation method ([20]) linked
via the characteristic function of a cooperative game1 to the
Shapley value (SV) cost allocation rule [21, 22].
In more detail, the Turvey perturbation method is a forward-
looking and more time- and location-specific method for
LRMC estimation, compared to the simpler average incre-
mental cost methods widely used by network companies
[17]. Furthermore, [23, 24] argue that the Turvey perturbation
method is the preferred option since it better aligns with the
underpinning principles governing LRMC. However, research
in [25] concluded that both methods can be equally used for
LRMC calculations.
At the same time, the SV gives a vector-valued solution to
a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, where the total
cost or worth of a coalition is defined by a single-valued char-
acteristic function. In our method, the characteristic function is
the probabilistic LRMC defined using the Turvey perturbation
method. The SV has found several applications including con-
sumer demand response compensation [26–28], transmission
network cost allocation [29–31], distribution network loss allo-
cation [32], and other cost allocation problems [26, 27, 33–35].
However, due to the computational complexity of computing
the exact SV for a large number of players, it’s application is
usually limited to small problems. Recent research in this area,
1A cooperative game models a game where a group of players cooperate
to earn a joint reward, which has to be shared among the players in a fair
and stable way.
nonetheless, has seen developments of approximate methods
of calculating the SV in polynomial time [27, 34–39]. In
[27], a comparison of the accuracy and scalability of two
approximate SV computation algorithms was made, namely
linear-time approximation [36] and stratified sampling [39, 40]
techniques. While the stratified sampling approach was more
accurate, the linear-time approximation required less memory
and computation time as the number of players increased. This
is a general finding, so with these methods, there is always
a trade-off between accuracy and computational complexity.
Moreover, some of these methods are only suited to weighted
voting games, which does not match our cost-allocation prob-
lem. In a different research direction, a clustering approach
was adopted in [38], where customers are segmented into
major classes. However, customers in the same class are
assigned the same SV. Conversely, for distribution network
cost allocation, this is not the case, as the SV should be
different for all customers.
In light of these shortcomings, we derive a computationally-
efficient clustering algorithm, to allocate network costs based
on the Turvey-Shapley value method. The SV is computed
at the level of clusters, and individual customers are allotted
a portion of this SV based on their average coincident peak
demand contribution to each coalition of their representative
cluster. This approximation approach is validated by compar-
ison to the exact SV calculation, for which the SV estimation
error is shown to be small and reduces as the number of
customers increases (i.e. when approximation become com-
putationally necessary). Furthermore, as the SV method best
allocates network costs in a principled, fair and stable manner,
we used it as a benchmark to measure the cost-reflectivity of
other cost allocation methodologies. In summary, the analysis
in this paper extends the preliminary results in our earlier
conference paper [41] in the following ways:
• We propose a probabilistic approach to the Turvey LRMC
computation via a Weibull distribution, which gives an
unbiased estimate of forward-looking network costs.
• We propose a peak load contribution clustering technique
interleaved with the Turvey-Shapley value method to com-
pute the Shapley value for large number of customers with
low computation time and estimation error.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology using
real customer load traces from the Solar Home Electricity
Data2. Our results show that the proposed allocation method
is the most reflective of network capacity costs compared to
other cost allocation methodologies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II provides preliminaries on cooperative game theory and the
Shapley value. In Section III, we describe the methodology,
including the Turvey pricing method. The results are presented
and discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide a background to cooperative
games, the Shapley value and its characteristics, and the Turvey
perturbation method.
2Dataset is available at https://data.nsw.gov.au/
3A. Cooperative Games
Formally, we consider the class of transferable utility (TU)
games, which are cooperative games that allow the transfer of
worths between players. If the players in a cooperative game
agree to work together, they form a coalition. If all n players
form a coalition, it is called the grand coalition. Each player
incurs some private cost in completing its component of the
joint action, while collectively, the joint action has some worth
associated with it.
Definition II.1. A TU game is given by Γ = 〈N , w〉 where:
• N is a set of n players, and
• w(S) is a characteristic function, w : 2n → <+ with
w(∅) = 0, that maps from each possible coalition S ⊆ N
to the worth of S.
Before defining the Shapley value, we first formally define
some important characteristics of any solution to a TU game.
Definition II.2. Given a Γ, a solution concept defines a worth
to each player, which is a vector of transfers (worths), φ =
(φ1, . . . , φi, . . . , φn) ∈ <n.
We denote the sum of worths as
∑
i∈S φi = φ(S). Some
desirable properties of solutions concepts include the follow-
ing; a solution is:
• Efficient if φ(S) = w(S), so that the worth vector exactly
divides the coalitions worth,
• Symmetric if φi = φj if w(S ∪ {i}) = w(S ∪ {j}), ∀ S ⊆
N \ {i, j}. This means that equal worths are made to
symmetric players, where symmetry means that we can ex-
change one player for the other in any coalition that contains
only one of the players and not change the coalition’s worth.
• Additive if for any two additive games the solution can be
given by φi(v1 +v2) = φi(v1)+φi(v2) for all players. That
is, an additive solution assigns worths to the players in the
combined game that are the sum of their worths in the two
individual games.
• Zero worth to a null player if a player i that contributes
nothing to any coalition, such that w(S ∪ {i}) = w(S) for
all S, then the player receives a worth of 0.
B. The Shapley Value (SV)
Solution concepts in cooperative game theory define divi-
sions of the group reward among players, while considering
the rewards available to each alternative coalition of players.
The SV is one of such solution concepts which also satisfies
the desirable properties listed above, by virtue of its definition.
Definition II.3. The SV allocates to player i in a coalitional
game 〈w,N〉 the worth:
φi(w) =
1
n
∑
S⊆N\i
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
(w(S ∪ {i})− w(S)) (1)
Here, the vector-valued function φ has the following in-
tuitive interpretation: consider a coalition being formed by
adding one player at a time. When i joins the coalition S,
its marginal worth is given by w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S). Then,
for each player, its SV worth is the average of its marginal
Algorithm 1 Exact Turvey-Shapley Value Algorithm (Exact)
N : set of players/customers, N = {1, .., n}
L: set of all coalitions, L = {S1, ..,Sl, ...,S2n−1}
1: for each customer i ∈ N do
2: for each coalition S ∈ L : i ∈ S do
3: µ = 50POE yearly peak demand of S
4: Find X ∼ W(α, β) of µ exceeding line limit x
5: α = µ/Γ(1 + 1/β) with β = 1.5
6: if P (X ≥ x) < 0.001 then
7: w(S) = P (X ≥ x)Y
8: else
9: w(S) = 0
10: end if
11: Compute MSi = w(S)− w(S − {i})
12: Compute KSi = (1/n!)(|S| − 1)! (n− |S|)!
13: end for
14: Return SV of i, φi(w) =
∑
S∈LKSiMSi
15: end for
contributions over the possible different orders in which the
coalition can be formed.
The expression in (1) can also be interpreted as a player’s
contribution to all subsets of N that do not contain it, where
the binomial term is the number of coalitions of size |S|.
We can further expand this expression to identify a useful
approximation. Specifically, the summation in (1) can be
expressed in terms of the size of the coalitions that i is added
to, as follows:
φi(w) =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
(n− 1
k
)−1 ∑
S∈Sk
(w(S ∪ {i})− w(S))

(2)
where: Sk = {S ⊆ N \ i : |S| = k} is the set of coalitions
of size k that exclude i. We can now approach the SV by
approximating the inner term for each size k ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}.
One approach is to statistically estimate the term:
χk =
(
n− 1
k
)−1 ∑
S∈Sk
(w(S ∪ {i})− w(S)) (3)
using a sample-based approach. This is a randomised sampling
algorithm described in detail in Section III-C.
C. The Turvey Perturbation Method
The Turvey perturbation method [20] is one technique
used to estimate the LRMC of capacity-based investments. It
quantifies the effects of a (small) permanent change in demand
Q on future capital costs C. It is defined in [25] as:
Turvey LRMC =
PV (∆C)
PV (∆Q)
(4)
The expression in (4) translates to–the ratio of the present
value of change in costs (due to a permanent change in
demand) to the present value of the permanent change in
demand. The Turvey perturbation method therefore involves
forecasting demand over the estimation period, with a certain
confidence level. For this, we assume a small growth in yearly
peak demand with a 50% probability of exceedance.
As explained in detail in the next section, in our method-
ology, the probability that this value exceeds the network
4line limit informs the LRMC. This probabilistic approach
to the Turvey perturbation method, achieved via a Weibull
distribution, is used to construct the characteristic function
for the SV computation.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we detail the steps taken to assess the cost-
reflectivity in the allocation of distribution network tariffs to
LV residential customers, with the SV allocation being the
benchmark. First, we explain the Turvey-Shapley value LRMC
estimation and allocation methodology. Second, we describe
algorithms to determine the exact SV for a set of customers
N , and its approximation. The approximation algorithms are
required to compute the SV for n > 25 players, with lower
computational burden and minimal loss in accuracy.
A. Turvey-Shapley Value LRMC Methodology
The proposed Turvey-Shapley value LRMC methodology
involves interleaving of a novel probabilistic approach to
the Turvey perturbation method with the SV characteristic
function, and is illustrated in Algorithm 1. In this section, we
explain the steps for the Turvey LRMC estimation and SV
cost allocation.
First, we calculate the line limit x of the given network
with line augmentation cost Y . This is given as the yearly
peak demand of the network (i.e. grand coalition of customers)
multiplied by a factor of 1.5 (to account for distribution line
emergency limit). We have assumed that the probability of
a coalition’s 50 POE peak demand exceeding the line limit
follows a Weibull distribution, X ∼ W(α, β)3. The two-
parameter Weibull distribution function is defined as:
Fα,β(x) = 1− exp
[
−
(x
α
)β]
for x ≥ 0 (5)
where α > 0 is the scale parameter and β > 0 is the shape
parameter. In order to obtain the standard fat-tailed Weibull
distribution that is required in this study, β is taken as 1.5.
Then, for each coalition, we assume a yearly peak demand
growth rate of 1% as the 50 POE value, which is taken as
the mean µ of the Weibull distribution. Given the mean and
shape factor, we calculate the scale factor of the distribution.
If the tail probability P (X ≥ x) of a coalition’s 50 POE
peak demand exceeding the line limit is less than 0.001, we
neglect the coalition cost (set as zero) in the incremental cost
(IC) calculations for a particular customer in each coalition
size. For example, if Y is $1M, then we neglect coalitions
with cost less than $1k, which improves the incremental cost
computation time of each customer. Otherwise, the coalition
cost is given as P (X ≥ x)Y , that is, the coalition’s expected
LRMC under the corresponding Weibull distribution. The SV
for each customer i ∈ N is calculated as the average of its
marginal contributions to all coalitions containing i, as in (1).
In the next three subsections, we describe the exact SV algo-
rithm (Exact), and two algorithms (Sampling and Clustering)
to compute the approximate SV for up to 25 customers.
3This choice is not essential to the method; any other fat-tailed distribution
could be used as well.
Algorithm 2 Randomised Sampling Algorithm (Sampling)
N : set of players/customers, N = {1, ..., n}
K: partition of set of k-sized coalitions, K = {S1, ..,Sk, ..,Sn}
1: for each customer i ∈ N do
2: for each set of k-sized coalitions Sk ∈ K do
3: Find G ⊂ Sk : ∀ Z ∈ G, i ∈ Z
4: if |Sk| < 10000 then
5: for each coalition g ∈ G do
6: θg =
(k−1)! (n−k)!
n!
(w(g)− w(g − {i}))
7: end for
8: ϑSk =
∑
g∈G θg
9: else
10: Sample |P| coalitions from |G| : |P| = K
11: for each coalition p ∈ P do
12: θp = (w(p)− w(p− {i}))
13: end for
14: Compute standard deviation σP of all θp∈P
15: Compute optimal sample size, |P ′| using (6)
16: Sample |P ′| coalitions from |G|
17: for each coalition p′ ∈ P ′ do
18: θp′ =
(k−1)! (n−k)!
n!
(w(p′)− w(p′ − {i}))
19: end for
20: ϑSk =
∑
p′∈P′ θp′
21: end if
22: end for
23: φi =
∑
Sk∈K ϑSk
24: end for
B. Direct Enumeration
The exact algorithm (Exact), also known as direct enumer-
ation, is based on (1) and is described in Algorithm 1. In
terms of computational speed, it performs well with n < 20
players. But with n > 25, its performance (w.r.t. speed and
memory requirements) deteriorates because of the time taken
and memory required to compute the large (2n − 1) × n
coalition matrix. Note that Line 2 in Algorithm 1 can be
broken down into n coalition sizes according to (2).
C. Randomised Sampling
As explained in Section II-B, we use a sample-based ran-
domised algorithm which statistically estimates (3), to provide
approximate SV calculations based on (2). With this, we do not
perform all the incremental cost calculations (2n−1) required
to compute the exact SV for each customer. Instead, we do this
only for coalition sets that contain more than 10,000 possible
coalitions of the same size. In Algorithm 2 (Sampling), we
first select randomly a pilot sample (|P| = K) from such
large coalitions, where K is determined by trial and error.
Then, the standard deviation σP of the marginal contribution
of customer i to the sampled coalition is computed, followed
by the calculation of the optimal sample size using:
|P ′| =
(ZσP
d
)2
(6)
where Z = 1.96 is the z-score of 95% confidence in a
Gaussian distribution and d = 0.2 is taken to be the margin
of error for the sampling estimation.
D. Clustering Method
The clustering method illustrated in Algorithm 3 is also
based on (2). In this method, we first cluster |Hm| = 125
5Algorithm 3 Clustering Algorithm (Clustering)
H: partition of set of network users, H := {H1, ..,Hh, ..,Hm}
N : set of players/clusters, N = {1, ..., n}
K: partition of set of k-sized coalitions, K = {S1, ..,Sk, ..,Sn}
1: Cluster |Hm| customers into n clusters
2: for each Hh ∈ H do
3: for t←− 1 to 100 step 1 do . 100 MC simulations
4: Sample |Hh| customers uniformly from |Hm|
5: for each cluster i ∈ N do
6: for each set of k-sized coalitions Sk ∈ K do
7: Find G ⊂ Sk : ∀ Z ∈ G, i ∈ Z
8: for each coalition g ∈ G do
9: Find Hhi ⊂ Hh . customers in cluster i
10: V
Hhi
g = [v
1
g , ..., v
|Hhi |
g ] . cust. contr. to w(g)
11: θg =
(k−1)! (n−k)!
n!
(w(g)− w(g − {i}))
12: end for
13: ϑSk =
∑
g∈G θg
14: end for
15: φi =
∑
Sk∈K ϑSk . SV of cluster i
16: φ
Hhi
t = (φi/|G|)
∑
g∈G V
Hhi
g . SV–customers in i
17: end for
18: end for
19: end for
customers from the Ausgrid Solar Home Electricity Data set
into n = 5 representative load profile clusters (with minimum
customer set |H1| = 25). Here, end-users are clustered based
on their half-hourly average daily consumption pattern for a
year using the k-means clustering algorithm. Next, for each set
of network users Hh ∈ H, we find the yearly demand (with
30-minute resolution) of each cluster i ∈ N , by summing
the half-hourly demand of all customers belonging to cluster
i. Then, we find the average contribution V H
h
i
g of member
customers to the yearly peak demand of cluster i over all
coalitions g ∈ G.
After computing the SV of each cluster, the cluster cost
is then apportioned to its member customers according to
their contribution. It is worth noting that the algorithm can
be scaled to compute the SV for |Hm| > 125 network users
in our dataset, with just an insignificant clustering overhead
computation cost for allocating customers into 5 clusters; and
moreover, it would scale to settings with up to 25 clusters
irrespective of the total number of customers..
IV. CASE STUDY, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we assess the computational performance
and accuracy of the SV approximation methods, the correlation
of SV with three peak demand indicators commonly used to
define tariffs, and compare alternative pricing methods with
the SV cost allocation.
To begin, we define the following three peak demand
indicators as follows:
• Coincident peak demand (CPD): This refers to a customer’s
coincident peak demand at the time of the network’s yearly
peak load.
• Individual peak demand (IPD): This refers to a customer’s
yearly peak demand.
• Total peak demand (TPD): This refers to the sum total of a
customer’s monthly peak demand values in a year.
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Fig. 1: (a) SV computation time for 5 – 25 customers (b) Error in approximate
SV calculation for 5 – 25 customers. For both plots, the y-axis is in log scale.
TABLE I: Network Tariff Data
Tariff
Type
Fixed
charge
c/day
Anytime
Energy
c/kWh
Off peak
Energy
c/kWh
Shoulder
Energy
c/kWh
Peak
Energy
c/kWh
Flat 40.097 11.163 - - -
ToU 40.097 - 2.805 7.086 27.335
As case study, the net load traces (solar PV and demand)
used in this work were sourced from the Ausgrid (DNSP in
NSW) Solar Home Electricity Data. The dataset comprises
three years of half-hourly resolution smart meter data for the
period between July 2010 to June 2013, for 300 residential
customers in the Sydney region of Australia. However, we
could only extract 125 customers from this dataset with
complete solar PV and demand data, for the period between
July 2012 to June 2013. This information is used to obtain the
above defined peak demand indicators for each customer.
We also employ network tariff data from Ausgrid4, given
in Table I5, which enables us make a rough estimate of the
revenue obtained for these customers under the flat and ToU
energy network prices.
A. SV Computation Time and Accuracy
Here, we compare the computational performance and accu-
racy of the different SV calculation algorithms. For this first set
of computations, we have assumed that all customers possess
solar PV, so the net load is used to compute their monthly peak
demand. Fig. 1a shows the SV computation time in minutes
for all customer sizes from 5 up to 25 users. A related point
to consider is that the exact SV computation for more than
25 users is not computationally feasible. The Exact algorithm
performs best for n < 15 customers, but with n ≥ 15, this
4Ausgrid Network Price List. Available at
https://www.ausgrid.com.au/Industry/Regulation/Network-prices.
5Peak: summer weekdays (Nov. to Mar.) between 2pm to 8pm, winter
weekdays (Jun. to Aug.) between 5pm to 9pm; Shoulder: weekdays year
round, between 7am to 10pm (exc. Peak periods); Off-peak: all other times.
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Fig. 2: SV linear correlation coefficient box plot. CPD–coincident peak
demand, IPD–individual peak demand, TPD–total peak demand. Note that
there is no statistical variance for n = 125.
is not the case. It takes 418 minutes to compute the SV for
n = 25 customers, due to the time and memory consuming
coalition matrix generation and the corresponding coalition
cost function calculations.
Conversely, there is a significant improvement in computa-
tional performance with the first approximate algorithm com-
pared to Exact. Sampling takes only 98 minutes to compute the
SV for n = 25 (about a quarter of the time taken for Exact).
This reduction in computation time is as a result of performing
IC calculations for a select (optimal) sample, using a constant
number as a pilot sampling size, instead of performing the
IC calculations for all coalitions (in Exact) at the same time.
Furthermore, splitting the total coalitions into n coalition sizes
in Sampling overcomes the memory limitations of Exact.
On the other hand, the clustering algorithm takes the least
time to compute the SV for n ≥ 15 customers. This is because
the SV calculation is done for only 5 players (or clusters), with
a little overhead computation cost for clustering.
To evaluate the accuracy of the sampling and the clustering
technique, we find the root mean square error (RMSE) in the
SV estimation. Fig. 1b shows RMSE values between 10−2 and
10−5 relative to mean values between 0.04 and 0.2 for n ≤ 25
customers. Although the sampling approach is more accurate
than the clustering technique for 5 < n ≤ 25, it cannot be
up-scaled to n > 25 players, without a significant increase in
the computation time. Besides, with the clustering technique,
the estimation error reduces as more customers are added to
make the clusters more representative.
B. SV Linear Correlation with Peak demand Indicators
This section shows the results obtained by finding the linear
correlation between the SV computed using the clustering
technique and the peak demand indicators, for two scenarios
(i) all customers without PV and (ii) all customers with
PV. Since the SV is computed for 100 Monte Carlo runs
based on uniform random sampling, the Pearson’s correlation
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Fig. 3: SV linear correlation scatter plot for 125 customers. CPD–coincident
peak demand, IPD–individual peak demand, TPD–total peak demand.
TABLE II: Mean SV correlation with Peak demand Indicators
Scenario Peak demandIndicator
Customers
25 50 75 100 125
Without PV
Coincident 0.8773 0.9134 0.9114 0.9272 0.9478
Individual 0.6668 0.5891 0.5644 0.5321 0.5065
Total 0.6626 0.5833 0.5541 0.5140 0.4848
With PV
Coincident 0.7967 0.8380 0.8780 0.9098 0.9473
Individual 0.4113 0.3625 0.3291 0.2918 0.2493
Total 0.5700 0.5512 0.5277 0.5016 0.4685
coefficients (R-value) are presented as box plots in Fig. 2 while
Table II shows the mean values, for H of size 25, 50, 75, 100,
and 125.
For Scenario 1 (Fig. 2a), the SV correlates more with
Individual peak demand than with Total peak demand but for
Scenario 2 (Fig. 2b), the converse is the case. It is worth noting
that Individual and Total corresponds to charging customers
based on their yearly peak load and monthly peak load re-
spectively. Without PV, a customer’s true demand is revealed,
which is less sensitive to weather, so individual peak demand
dominates. However, with PV, a customer’s demand profile is
modified with PV generation which is season-dependent, and
as such it’s better to charge customers on a monthly basis.
Nevertheless, for both scenarios, the SV correlates most with
Coincident peak demand, because it drives augmentation cost
the most.
Figs. 3a and 3b show the scatter plot for SV correlation
with the peak demand indicators for n = 125 customers
without PV and with PV respectively. For Scenario 1, the
mean R-values are 0.948, 0.507 and 0.485, for Coincident,
Individual, and Total peak demand respectively while the
R-values for Scenario 2 are 0.947, 0.249 and 0.468, for
Coincident, Individual, and Total peak demand respectively.
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Fig. 4: (a) Correlation between cost allocation method and peak demand
variants (top) and error in cost allocation from the SV allocation (bottom).
EB–energy-based, CP–coincident peak, YP–yearly peak, MP–monthly peak.
While CPD and TPD have similar values in both scenarios,
IPD is considerably different. This is because a customer’s
(individual) yearly peak demand changes significantly with the
addition of PV.
C. Comparison of Cost Allocation Methodologies
Here, we evaluate how different energy-based and peak
demand-based cost allocation methodologies compare to the
SV, by measuring the correlation between normalised cus-
tomer cost allocation and specifically-defined peak demand
indicators. First, we perform the SV computation for n = 125
customers, for both scenarios. Then, we estimate the revenue
obtained by the DNSP for these customers under the two
tariffs (Flat- and ToU-based) described in Section III. For
this, we have have neglected the feed-in-tariff (FiT) as it is
administered through a different mechanism and handled by
retailers in the Australian electricity system’s regulatory and
billing arrangements. Therefore, we use only the power import
from the grid for our calculations.
We consider the following cost allocation methods in our
analysis:
• Energy-based (EB - Flat or ToU)
• Coincident peak load (CP - Coincident peak)
• Yearly peak load (YP - Individual peak)
• Monthly peak load (MP - Total peak) and
• Shapley value cost allocation (SV)
In the first method, cost allocation is done according to the
revenue calculations under Flat and ToU tariff for n = 125
customers, using tariff values in Table I. For the rest, we split
the total revenue obtained using the energy-based tariffs, ac-
cording to the normalised SV and the normalised Coincident,
Individual, and Total peak demand values for each customer.
The top part of Fig. 4 shows the correlation between the
different cost allocation methodologies and the peak demand
indicators. From these, we can deduce that the SV provides
a fine balance between coincident, individual and aggregate
peak demand, since it properly accounts for network usage at
times other than the coincident network peak. This is by virtue
of the way it is being computed, by evaluating the marginal
contribution of customers to all possible coalitions. Although,
the major cost driver for distribution networks is the coincident
peak demand, it is necessary for a cost-reflective tariff design
to appropriately account for aggregate and individual customer
peak demand. Furthermore, the yearly and monthly peak de-
mand allocation are also not cost-reflective, since they have a
lower correlation with coincident peak demand compared with
the SV allocation. Energy-based allocation methods perform
worst as they show much lower correlation with the peak
demand indicators. However, the results for Scenario 2 show
that ToU-energy based allocation is better than that of Flat-
energy based allocation as it shows comparatively higher R-
values. Moreover, these results implicitly show that inter-
customer subsidies will be reduced since customers would
be paying their fair share, given the similar R-value for
Coincident peak demand in both scenarios.
At the bottom part of Fig. 4, we show the error (RMSE) in
actual cost values that will arise when a DNSP allocates cost
to customers using less optimal cost allocation methodologies.
This translates to inaccurate wealth transfer amongst cus-
tomers in a distribution network. As expected, there are higher
RMSE values resulting from energy-based cost allocation
methods. This implies that they are least cost-reflective for
both scenarios, both in terms of cost-causality and equity in
cost allocation. Also, for both scenarios, the coincident peak
load allocation results in the least error because the main cost
driver for networks is the coincident peak. While the monthly
peak allocation, and the yearly peak demand allocation method
results in similar RMSE values for Scenario 1, this is not the
case for the second scenario. When all customers possess PV,
the monthly peak allocation results in slightly lower RMSE
compared to the yearly peak demand allocation. This shows
that for residential customers with PV, using a monthly peak
demand network tariff is more cost reflective than a yearly
peak demand tariff. It will be unfair to charge customers based
on their sole highest yearly peak demand, which occurs in just
one month of a year, and does not account for the seasonality
in energy consumption which comes with PV generation.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we showed the efficacy of the Turvey-Shapley
value method in calculating and apportioning LRMC to net-
work users in a cost-reflective way and with low computational
burden using the proposed clustering technique.
We have demonstrated that the SV is a cost-reflective
cost allocation method for networks with a large number of
customers, regardless of PV adoption. This is because the SV
is a principled technique, which provides a proper balance
between the peak demand indicators (network cost drivers).
This makes for a fair cost allocation, which further reduces
inter-customer subsidies. Other peak demand-based cost allo-
cation approaches perform well up to the extent to which they
appropriately balance the peak demand indicators, but with a
greater emphasis on coincident peak demand. Furthermore, our
results show that energy-based cost allocation methodologies
are least cost-reflective as they least correlate with the peak
demand indicators.
8For future work, we will consider LRMC allocation for cus-
tomers with both PV and batteries. In this case, an optimisation
would have to be solved for each cost function computation.
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